peculiar problems regarding the ability of a corporation to act beyond the bounds of the state giving it life-problems early posed by the Supreme Court's holding in Bank of Augusta v. Earle 6 that a corporation was not entitled to the same ambulatory privileges as a citizen and could not freely do business beyond the geographical confines of its domicile. Despite the obvious fact that geographical lines are inherently unwieldly and unrealistic for determining legal controls over corporate activity-particularly in an economy as mobile as our own-the states have traditionally been quite free to pursue their own best interests by restricting the entrance of, requiring information from, governing the actions of, and assuring their share of revenue from, corporate entities created by sister sovereignties.
and perhaps repeating some of these acts in the specific county in which the corporation intends to settle.
2 Insofar as the purposes of these requirements vary, it would be possible for state legislatures to provide various disabilities or penalties for noncompliance. Or, absent such express directions, it would not be surprising to find the judiciary suiting a particular punishment to a particular form of noncompliance. In fact, such legislative and judicial efforts are common. 13 For purposes of this Note, however, only complete failure to do any of the acts required by local law will be classed as noncompliance. Any partial compliance, and the nature of it, will be clearly labeled. Second, a matter of jurisdiction. There lingers in this field a problem stemming from our parallel system of federal and state courts. Before Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 1 4 it was possible for a foreign corporation denied access to state courts for the enforcement of its claims to turn to the federal courts to secure the desired relief, provided the necessary jurisdictional requirements were met. 15 Now, however, in cases based on diversity of citizenship, each federal court is to apply the law of the state in which it sits, including the statute barring a foreign corporation from suit.'
6 Thus, the policies of the state evinced through the domestication laws and their interpretation are recognized and respected by the federal judiciary.' 7 Before attempting to explore the effects of noncompliance, inquiry must focus on the kinds of conduct that require a corporation to qualify to do business in a state other than that of its incorporation, the kinds of conduct that will subject a foreign corporation to the jurisdiction of such a state, variations among the statutes, according to their purposes, as to the degree and intensity of conduct required, and constitutional limitations on the ability of states to deal with intruding foreign corporations. These issues have been raised so repeatedly that the principles generally applied in resolving them are readily available. Unfortunately, however, both principles and resolutions serve more to label a result than to explicate the rationale for achieving it.
A foreign corporation going into a state and erecting a manufacturing plant for the local production, distribution, and sale of its goods would clearly be required to domesticate. Its conduct would amount to "doing business" locally and it would be subject to the jurisdiction of local courts. The state has a legitimate interest in making certain demands of a corporation engaged, or proposing to engage, in "intrastate activities" before allowing it to take advantage of local facilities for police protection, to draw on the local labor force, to contract with local citizens and concerns, to use the state courts, and to do all those things that a local association, similarly situated, would not be entitled to do without complying with the analogous requirements for domestic incorporation.' 8 At the other extreme, it is almost as clear that a corporation which receives by mail from an out-ofstate citizen, at its office in its state of incorporation, a single order for a particular item, which it then mails to that buyer, would not have to comply with the domestication laws of that state as a condition precedent to suing the buyer and would probably not be amenable to service of process in the buyer's state. For these purposes it has done no business in that state. Between these extremes lies the factual 1 9 continuum on which may be placed countless decisions 20 that must face the question of whether certain conduct constitutes "intrastate business" 21 All legislation making foreign corporations amenable to judicial process in the state in which they seek the privilege of doing business is predicated upon the right of the state to protect its citizens in their controversies with such corporations by requiring that the same be adjudicated in the courts of the state rather than compelling its citizens to travel to remote places to litigate such controversies. '9 Whether a corporation is doing business within the terms of a local domestication statute is always a question of fact. E.g., Brown v. Farmer & Ochs Co., 209 F.2d 703, 706 (6th Cir. 1954) .
.20 "The published decisions on what constitutes 'doing business' in a State by a foreign corporation are literally legion." Echeverry v. Kellogg Switchboard & Supply Co., 175 F.2d 900, 902 (2d Cir. 1949) .
2 1 Held to constitute intrastate activity so as to bar the action of plaintiff corporation: Cohn-Hall-Marx Co. v. Feinberg, 214 Minn. 584, 8 N.W.2d 825 (1943) (contract; negotiations leading to contract carried on by resident agent); Case v. Mills Novelty Co., 187 Miss. 673, 193 So. 625 (1940) 223 Wis. 231, 270 N.W. 545 (1936) (conversion; contract of assignment of converted property to foreign corporation made in state after property had come to rest there). 22While there appears to be no legal significance in the phrase used-"intrastate," "local," or "doing business"-a distinction may be noted between the amount of local activity that will be "doing business" for service of process on a foreign corporation or for substituted service on the secretary of state, and the sometimes greater amount that will require the corporation to domesticate in order to maintain a suit. See Keane & Collins, Changing Concepts of What Constitutes "Doing Business" by Foreign Corporations, 42 MARQ. L. REv. 151, 160-62 (1958) ; 26 GEo. WAsH. L. Ray. 735, 737 n.21 (1958) . Compare Toedman v. Nooter Corp., 180 Kan. 703, 308 P.2d 138 (1957), and Malavasi v. Villavecchia, 62 N.J. Super. 510, 163 A.2d 214 (Super. Ct. 1960) , with William L. Bonnell Co. v. Katz, 23 Misc. 2d 1028 , 196 N.Y.S.2d 763 (Sup. Ct. 1960 , and Knight Prods., Inc. v. Donnen-Fuel Co., 20 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Sup. Ct. 1940) .
The difference between forbidding access by foreign corporations to the court of the state, because of their failure to comply with the statutory doing business" 23 for the particular issue being litigated. " [D] eterminaprovisions for doing business therein, and . . . providing for service on a designated agent where, without complying with the statute, they undertake to do business in the state . . . is that, while the former is strictly construed so that the exclusion from access to the courts of the state requires a strong showing that the statute has been violated, the latter is liberally construed since otherwise citizens of the state would be forced to resort to another jurisdiction in order to maintain suits .... Mississippi Wood Preserving Co. v. Rothschild, 201 F.2d 233, 236 (5th Cir. 1953 § 55-145(b) (1960) , which purports to make a foreign parent subject to service through the local subsidiary, with Fitzgerald v. tion of the applicable rule presents no serious difficulty. Application of the rule to given facts, however, often does." 24 Increasingly legislatures are attempting to lighten the judicial load by statutes declaring that certain acts do not constitute doing business so as to require domestication 25 or equating certain conduct with a doing of local business for amenability to service of process. 26 The utility or necessity of the former may be questioned where they comprise no more than existing precedents 27 or a list of activities which no court today would seriously consider sufficient to require domestication. 28 And the success of the jurisdiction statutes in reducing litigation is questionable if Minnesota's experience is illustrative, 2 9 for attempts to extend jurisdiction to the constitutional limits may raise new problems for the courts without providing automatic answers to the old.
There are several principles which serve to limit the exercise of state power over foreign corporations with respect to domestication requirements. One, based on the commerce clause of the federal constitution, is that Hilton Hotels Corp., 183 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1960) , which held a parent corporation cannot be served to gain jurisdiction over an independent foreign subsidiary.
Held Another, relating to federal supremacy, is that federal corporations are not "foreign" and therefore fall outside the purview of these state statutes.
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A third, largely derived from older precedents, is that the doing of a single act or isolated transaction will not amount to the doing of business sufficient to require domestication. Despite the fascinating subtlety or bewilderment with which these rules may be applied, their interpretation and interplay are not the subject of this Note. Out of the annual plethora of cases, this Note shall concern itself with those that preliminarily find the corporation has acted in such a way as to come within the state's regulatory jurisdiction and that are not disposed of on the basis of some self-limitation on that jurisdiction.
II. PENAL AND INJUNCTIVE SANCTIONS
State legislatures commonly provide for a fine to be levied upon a foreign corporation for either engaging in local business before domestication 33 or failing to file the requisite documents. Obviously they serve both a revenue and-depending upon the size of the fine-a deterrent function. 39 But it must be recognized that the deterrent effect of any fixed penalty is inversely proportional to the size of the corporation involved. A large fine may well serve to filter out small, financially tenuous corporations. So far as domestication's informational function is concerned this selective deterrence might provide adequate protection for local citizens, as the financial soundness of larger companies can often be ascertained by potential creditors despite a failure to file locally. Furthermore, the greater resources of these companies assure a margin of security against the eventuality of litigation with local citizens. which would have been imposed had the corporation qualified upon first entering the state, plus either some further small penalty or a percentage of the accrued amount. This is a logical way to calculate the amount of the corporation's liability and, insofar as the penalty varies directly with the offender's size, it will, unlike a fixed fine, bar both large and small foreign entities with equal selectivity. Either in conjunction with or in lieu of the imposition of a fine, the state may label the conducting of precompliance business a misdemeanor.2 No special consequences ordinarily flow from this appellation.
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A few jurisdictions give the state attorney general standing to sue out an injunction against further local activity by an undomesticated foreign corporation.
4 4 Vermont has tempered this by authorizing discontinuance of such a suit upon subsequent compliance by the corporation 4 5 This restraint is consistent with the use of these laws to compel disclosure of relevant information rather than to punish or banish the offending corporation; it may also indicate a recognition that many, if not most, violations are unwitting. The same policy is evident in the many statutes providing for the reinstatement of a foreign corporation denied the privilege of carrying on local activity if it subsequently complies.
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III. DISABILITIEs
The most important of the possible consequences of a foreign corporation's failure to domesticate is the likelihood that it will be denied access to the state's courts or find its obligations in that state impaired. The insecurity injected into normal business activities by the threat of unenforceability usually provides a sufficient incentive to domesticate. 47 4 2 E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 10, §21(94) (Supp. 1960 §861 (1958) . The Massachusetts statute authorizes an injunction only "until compliance," whereas the New Hampshire provision, clearly labeled a "penalty," seems to permit a permanent injunction against all further business in the state by the offending corporation, notwithstanding any possible later willingness to domesticate. The authorized scope of injunctions under the other two statutes is problematical, and there is no case law to shed light on the question. Where there is no statute giving injunctive powers for the specific purpose of banishing undomesticated foreign corporations, the same result might be achieved by quo warranto, see State ex rel. Attorney General v. Western Mut. Life & Acc. Soc'y, 47 Ohio St. 167, 24 N.E. 392 (1890) (dictum), although there seems to be no reported case in which the writ was employed successfully to oust a foreign corporation whose sole offense was failure to domesticate, except Ignoring minor verbal differences, this kind of state control of precompliance commercial activity today consists of enactments that (1) declare all acts by an undomesticated foreign corporation void,
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(2) bar all suits by an offending corporation on transactions arising out of such activity, 4 9 (3) withhold the right to maintain any action on intrastate transactions until compliance, 50 or (4) deny access to the courts for any purpose until compliance.
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Two common supplementary provisions preserve the right to defend suits while declaring precompliance contracts not invalid 5 2 and set the same disabilities upon assignees of any right or claim as apply to the foreign assignor.
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There are a limited number of factual contexts in which undomesticated corporations have most commonly invoked state judicial processes only to be denied relief because of the operation of these laws.
A. Contract Actions
An undomesticated foreign corporation which brings suit for amounts due under a contract with a local domiciliary is apt to be met at the outset with a motion to dismiss or its local equivalent.
54 Though an obvious injustice will result from defendant's retention of plaintiff's performance if the motion is granted, 55 Note that this is not a judgment on the merits and has no res judicata effect. In Admiral Corp. v. Trio Television Sales & Serv., 138 Colo. 157, 330 P.2d 1106 (1958 , a suit which had been abated for noncompliance was held not to bar a subsequent suit. The dissent argued that it should be res judicata because dismissal came after the evidence was in and after the merits had been considered. However, the majority position seems correct inasmuch as the court grounded its dismissal specifically on noncompliance.
Some state courts have thought that dismissal was too harsh and have applied an equitable estoppel against a defendant retaining the contract benefits. See cases collected in 17 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 8519, at 728 n. 34 (rev. vol. 1960) . [Voi.110:241 plaintiff, having chosen to do business in violation of local law, is not entitled to use local courts for the resolution of difficulties arising from this unlawful conduct. This rationale raises several interesting problems. Does it matter where the contract was made or performed, or where payment was to be made? Will the courts of other states allow this corporation to obtain relief if defendant can properly be served therein? Finally, how much freedom for judicial interpretation is provided by the words of the particular statute being applied?
Some older statutes declared contracts or acts by undomesticated corporations "void," 16 but the difficulties and uncertainties attending this classification have led most legislatures to prescribe the consequences of noncompliance in more detail; today only Arizona has an all-acts-void statute.
57 Such a provision is apt to leave foreign corporations totally without remedy with respect to its intrastate commercial transactions. Probably the strongest impetus for the abandonment of this terminology was the fluid meaning of the word "void." The term's strict application could conceivably boomerang to the serious detriment of those whom the statute was intended to protect. 59 Even if this does not occur, the protection of local interests hardly seems to require the total nullification of The argument for refusing to apply estoppel, based on the policy of prohibitory statutes, is presented in id. at 732. After an extensive review of the authorities, the Delaware high court refused to allow a defendant to retain benefits where plaintiff's omission consisted of a failure to appoint a statutory agent. Model Heating Co. v. Magarity, 25 Del. 459, 81 Atl. 394 (1911) . " [A] different construction would open an avenue of easy escape to the dishonest debtor, and produce in many cases a harsh result, especially where the default might be due to oversight and neglect, rather than intentional wrong." Protective Fin. Corp. v. Glass, 100 NJ.L. 85, 87, 125 AtI. 879, 880 (Sup. Ct. 1924 58The corporation's dilemma may be given an extra edge where the local courts read into the provision a manifestation of the state's "public policy." See National Union Indem. Co. v. Bruce Bros., 44 Ariz. 454, 38 P.2d 648 (1934) . The phrase is so vague that it can justify almost anything. For example, continued enforcement of a disability after a statutory amendment which left the sanction unexpressed was explained in terms of public policy, the court refusing to find a repeal by implication from an increase in the penalty. Hicks Body Co. v. Ward Body Works, Inc., 233 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1956 ).
However, under such a statute, a foreign corporation need not fear that its contracts will be open to attack by all third parties who may be affected by them. See St. Avit v. Kettle River Co., 216 Fed. 872 (8th Cir. 1914 59 To say that the legislature intended the statute to render void contracts made without complying with it is to say that the legislature intended that if a foreign company should write life insurance in this state it might take the premiums, and then, upon the death of the person insured, refuse to pay the policies; and it is to say that a farmer of this state may purchase a machine or a herd of cattle from a nonresident corporation on credit, secure the price by chattel mortgage, refuse to pay, and then defeat an action of replevin for the property. Such an interpretation might attract the enthusiastic admiration of the highwayman, but it has nothing to commend itself to a court of justice. State v. American Book Co., 69 Kan. 1, 17, 76 Pac. 411, 416, appeal dismissed, 193 U.S. 49 (1904) . agreements consciously undertaken. If the concept of nullification were taken seriously, an otherwise innocent foreign corporation could as well be swindled by an angling domiciliary as vice-versa, voidness being mutual. Finally, such a provision allows excessive judicial discretion, as nothing inherent in the term makes certain the consequences which will follow from its application. 60 Even changes in phraseology have not always been successful in eliminating the disquieting features. In Missouri, where the courts had for years interpreted the legislative pronouncement to mean that precompliance contracts were incurably void, 01 Where a statute imposes fines for noncompliance and there is no express provision concerning the maintenance of contract actions, the courts have often held the penal amount to be exclusive and have refused to impose additional disabilities.
6 6 But where the legislature has decreed contracts unenforceable and an undomesticated corporation sues to enforce performance, no rule of interpretation and no undesirable incidental effects deter the courts' rigorous application of the statute. 67 Nor will the plaintiff usually be able to avoid the disability by assigning its claim to a party otherwise capable of bringing suit.
6 8 Thus, in these cases, the corporation-or 60 See Note, 25 CoLum. L. REv. 806, 806-11 (1925) . Pac. 891 (1921) . This formulation does not indicate what would happen in a local suit for restitution or in a suit on the contract in another jurisdiction, assuming defendant could be served.
68 The assignee will be treated in the same manner as the corporate assignor. Thus, if the defense of noncompliance would bar a suit by the corporation, the whoever asserts its claim-will be out of court unless the technical noncompliance was so insignificant that the corporation may be considered to have complied "substantially."
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Notwithstanding statutes making contracts "void" or "unenforceable," a corporate plaintiff often can withstand a motion to dismiss by averring that the transaction or contract was out-of-state 7 0 or that the suit is not assignee's suit will be dismissed. Seattle Merchants' Ass'n v. § 303.20 (1947) . The failure to use the statute to secure compliance by both assignor and assignee is probably explicable by the fact that a potential assignee whose own local standing is uncertain will not ordinarily take claims of doubtful enforceability. The relaxation of these rules in the area of negotiable instruments, where there is a countervailing policy to foster the circulation of commercial paper, is discussed in 17 FLETcHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 8526 (rev. vol. 1960 ).
The position of assignees, trustees, and receivers of dissolved or insolvent foreign corporations is unsettled. The predominant view is that the receiver will be barred from suit if the corporation would have been. Wiestling v. Marthim, 1 Ind. App. 217, 27 N.E. 576 (1891) 1958), which allows suit by the assignee when a corporation "has acquired all or substantially all of [assignor's] assets.' As to the "curability" of defects generally, see pp. 266-69 infra.
69 "Substantial" compliance has been found for these purposes where a previously domesticated corporation failed to repeat the necessary acts of compliance under a new domestication statute and suit was brought on a transaction antedating the new statute, Industrial Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Meyers-Abel Co., 12 Ariz. 48, 95 Pac. 115 (1908) , where the corporation sued under a name which was slightly different from that under which it was domesticated, Indian Ref. Pac. 1049 Pac. (1909 (no substantial compliance where charter not filed with county recorder). Decisions such as these should not prevent the state from subsequently requiring full compliance, recovering penalties, or barring further local activity, for the substantiality of compliance may properly depend on the purpose for which noncompliance is invoked.
70 The distinction pointed out earlier between statutes which close the courts' doors for any purpose and those which do so only for controversies arising from intrastate transactions, see text accompanying notes 50-51 mipra, is important in these situations.
one on or under the contract. The latter plea has little application beyond the fictional intricacies of quasi-contract, 71 but the former involves subtle principles of conflict of laws. The court must decide the case in such a way as not to give domestication statutes extraterritorial effect.
72 Of course, a contract may have several significant stages which can be split among two or more states, such as the places of negotiation, execution, performance, passing of title, and payment. Where less than all of the operative acts have been done or are agreed to be done in the forum state, the conflicts problem can be immense; but in practice the courts have not been greatly concerned with the complexities. More often than not their first step has been to apply the conflicts rule that the law governing shall be that of the place of the "making" of the contract, 73 the "making" in turn to depend upon where the last act to give the contract binding effect was performed. 74 If that act occurred outside the forum state, the domestication law of the forum does not govern the transaction. In no case has there been inquiry into the "whole" law-including the law of the conflict of laws-of the place where the contract was "made," not even in cases in which the last act of contracting was the only contact with that place and the court might properly suspect that the making of the contract was carefully contrived so as to evade the local domestication statute. A different result can obtain if the contract was "void" in the place of making, in which case no court is apt to enforce it 73 This is the usual conflicts of law rule governing contracts, and there can be no objection to the forum making this initial characterization according to its own law. Other possible choices are the law of the state where the "essential" contacts are grouped and the law of the state where performance is contemplated. While reason might commend either of these alternatives in some situations, courts have seldom done so. See 940 (1942) , the foreign corporation would not be bound on any contract until it had been signed at the home office. Every other significant contact took place in the state where it failed to domesticate-solicitation, negotiation, performance. Application of the last-act-tomake-it-binding test absolved plaintiff of the local statutory infirmity. See Hayes, Iowa Corporations & Partnerships: 1942 -1952 , 38 IowA L. REv. 462, 489 (1953 . The uniformity with which courts use the "place of making" and the "last act" as controlling factors may account for the common practice of requiring home office acceptance of all out-of-state contracts. A small and distinct portion of this problem Plaintiff's right to maintain a contract suit may remain unimpaired if the defendant can be found to have "waived" plaintiff's noncompliance; 76 this possibility obtains primarily in those jurisdictions whose statutes do not bar plaintiff's suit but merely withhold a remedy until compliance is completed. In such a case, it is reasoned that since defendant never had a defense on the merits and could only abate the suit until plaintiff complied, the court may overlook the technicality of requiring compliance if the defense has not been raised at an early stage. This result appears equitable as between the parties-it may make sense to penalize the defendant for neglect where the court's resources have been taxed by a trial-but it entirely overlooks the state's interest. By denying defendant the right to stave off final judgment at least until plaintiff complies, the court permits the corporate offender to obtain its judgment without complying-in direct contravention of the statute. The state may find this particularly objectionable if it becomes the feeling of defendants generally that it is not to their advantage to plead a merely dilatory defense 77 and foreign corporations cease to consider the disability a spur to compliance.
B. Protection of Property and Related Rights
Notwithstanding statutes barring the maintenance of an action for failure to domesticate, there are procedures-of varying degrees of efficacy -by which a foreign corporation can use local courts to protect its property within the state.
Among the methods for protection of personalty which have met with some success are replevin 7 s-sometimes even though the wrongful retention of the property arose from a contract which in that state would be wholly void 79, trover,8 0 and conversion. 8 ' The rationale usually expressed is a distinction between contract and tort.
is dealt with by statutes declaring undomesticated corporations ineligible to enter into any contract for certain state construction which is required to be let by sealed bid. E.g., Neb. Laws 1959, ch. 77 Courts have permitted foreign corporations to protect their real property within the state by ejectment and recovery of possession. 82 On the other hand, suits to foreclose mortgages have not been uniformly successful. The Supreme Court has allowed a state to deny foreclosure of a mortgage on local land by an incompletely domesticated corporation, even though all the contacts of the note obligation which the mortgage secured were made in another state. The question of "waiver" of the defense of noncompliance has not been squarely presented to the courts in mortgage foreclosure cases as it has in the context of contracts. However, the fact of noncompliance has been raised and rejected in two cases. One arose on a petition to vacate a prior judgment; 8 7 the other was a suit to quiet title against an execution sale purchaser. s 8 In both there was a failure to plead noncompliance at the time of foreclosure, an active defense on other grounds, and a final judgment decreeing foreclosure on behalf of the foreign corporation. These cases are obviously much stronger for penalizing the defendant's delay, even considering the state's interest in securing compliance, than such as did so in the contract areas, for here the postjudgment assertion of noncompliance is a collateral attack on that judgment which may affect the rights of third parties and disrupt orderly judicial procedure. The denial of the bar of noncompliance because of a prolonged delay also subserves the state's policy, at least where precompliance contracts are void, by urging the defendant to diligence in unearthing plaintiff's unauthorized conduct. However, this consideration is not peculiar to foreclosure cases.
Analogous to the protection-of-property suits are those in which a foreign corporation seeks to enjoin the use or registration of a deceptively similar corporate name or seeks to invoke a local fair trade law in order to enforce a resale price maintenance policy. It is to be observed, however, that no effort has been made by the courts to analogize to "protection of property" when confronted with these situations 8s9 Although it has been held that a foreign corporation which has done no local business-and thus is not subject to domestication requirements or to disabilities for failure to domesticate--cannot enjoin a local corporation from using a deceptively similar name, since it would be inimical to the public policy of the state to allow an attack on a corporate name approved by the state, 9 the New York courts have allowed an injunction both when the foreign corporation was not doing intrastate business 91 and when it was 2 -the latter despite the fact that plaintiff's case would require affirmative proof of its unauthorized intrastate conduct. It would seem to be clearly to the state's advantage for a court to allow such actions by foreign corporations; local citizens will benefit, for when a corporate name is "deceptively similar," it is they who may be duped and injured. Therefore, the states should be hospitable to these suits, notwithstanding their interest in regulating foreign corporations.
89 It is arguable that a corporation should be able to protect the "property" which it has in its name or its goodwill as readily as its physical possessions, no matter how those interests are labeled for other purposes. Considering the purposes for which domestication statutes are enacted, a failure "to strictly comply with the statutes . . . does not so shock the conscience of the chancellor as to make it a prey to all evilly disposed persons." Northwest Ready Roofing Co. v. Antes, 117 Neb. 121, 124, 219 N.W. 848, 850 (1928) . The Fifth Circuit came close to a protection-of-plaintiff's-property analysis when it allowed suit for an injunction in Scalise v. National Util. Serv., Inc., 120 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1941) . In that case, plaintiff, an unregistered foreign corporation, filed suit to enjoin defendant from using its name. When it was discovered that plaintiff was not registered, the action was abated for the specific purpose of allowing it to register. Defendant, however, which was also unregistered, succeeded in domesticating before plaintiff had an opportunity to do so, hoping thereby to foreclose its action. The court nevertheless enjoined defendant's use of plaintiff's name.
90 Hazelton Boiler Co. v. Hazelton Tripod Boiler Co., 142 Ill. 494, 30 N.E. 339 (1892) . Cf. Investors Syndicate of America, Inc. v. Hughes, 378 Ill. 413, 38 N.E.2d 754 (1942 1065 (1936) , suit for an injunction against the use of a deceptively similar name was allowed, but no inquiry was made as to whether the corporation was engaged in intrastate business.
Several recent decisions have considered whether an undomesticated foreign corporation can take advantage of a local fair trade statute by enjoining sales below the fixed price. They clearly acknowledge that mere resort to local courts for this purpose is not a doing of business sufficient to subject the corporation to domestication requirements and incapacitate it from suing before compliance. 93 However, if other acts of the corporation amount to intrastate business, the corporation may be prevented from invoking the fair trade statute, even though the business which it wants ultimately to defend is interstate. 94 Since the power to enforce a fair trade policy derives solely from state statutes, 95 it is only fair, as the New Jersey court observed in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Inc., 6 to require a foreign corporation "which seeks to take advantage of a cause of action given it by one of our laws, to comply with the provisions of the other as a condition to taking advantage of the other statute."
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Eli Lilly illustrates the unfortunate extent to which small factual variations may affect the results of cases in this area. In Remington Arms Co. v. Lechmere Tire & Sales Co., 98 where plaintiff corporation was engaged in only slightly less local activity 9 9 than that described in Lilly,' 00 the Massachusetts court held that the corporation was engaged solely in interstate business and could invoke the local fair trade act as a necessary incident to that business. The decision was clearly based on a construction of the local domestication statute, not on the judges' interpretation of the constitutional limits of state regulation of foreign corporations. 10 ' The court conceded that the precedents on which it relied might be a bit old fashioned in the light of more recent Supreme Court cases under the commerce clause, but it expressly dismissed those cases as irrelevant to the interpretation of the state statute. . 131, 158 N.E.2d 134 (1959) . 99 Remington's activity in Massachusetts consisted of maintaining a local office with a full-time employee and bank account, employing solicitor-salesmen, displaying sample guns, giving chevrons to gun clubs, employing field agents and shoppers to detect violations of local fair trade contracts, and suing occasionally to enforce resale price maintenance. Id. at 133-35, 158 N.E.2d at 136-37 . 100 Lilly's activity in New Jersey consisted of maintaining a local office with two permanent employees and eighteen "detailmen," whose salaries were paid by the home office and whose function was to visit retail pharmacists, physicians, and hospitals in order to promote plaintiff's products. The detailmen occasionally accepted retailers' orders for transmittal to a wholesaler. 57 N.J. Super. at 298-99, 154 A. when it came to dispose of Remington in order to decide Lilly, rejected the Massachusetts case on the ground that it might have gone the other way had counsel argued the obsolescence of the older cases.'
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The apparent lack of predictability which these two cases suggest is especially unfortunate in an area where the substantive law may have the effect of drawing large corporations into local litigation to enforce rights given to them under local law, only to be confronted by the challenge that previous local promotional activities add up to local doing of business. And it is difficult to find possible patterns for the future by looking to the policy of the fair trade laws themselves. To the extent that they are intended to protect local retailers against loss-leader competition and local consumers against fraudulent practices which might be introduced to promote that competition, 10 4 the courts might well be motivated to place as few obstacles as possible in the way of a national producer trying to enforce these laws. The motivation might be especially strong if the defendant who invokes the domestication statute has apparently not been the victim of any of the specific evils intended to be prevented by the statute. Balancing this motivation is the rationale expressed by the New Jersey court: insofar as the fair trade law is designed to confer an economic advantage upon the plaintiff-by protecting its good will as represented by its brand name' 0 5 -the state can rightly insist that the corporation be held to rigorous compliance with state laws before it may enforce that advantage.'0 6
C. Arbitration
New York has faced, virtually alone, the problem of whether an undomesticated foreign corporation can use local courts to compel arbitration under a locally made contract. Its domestication statute provides that no "action" can be maintained by such corporation 0 7 The first construction of the statute on this point was to the effect that arbitration would be barred since the term "action" encompasses all legal remedies which require invocation of the jurisdiction of the courts.' 0 8 But in In the Matter of Tugee Laces, Inc.' 1 9 the New York Court of Appeals accepted the contrary view, classing arbitration as a "special proceeding" and holding that service of notice to arbitrate is not the institution of an "action" within the meaning of the domestication statute."
This conclusion may have been carried another step by the decision of a lower New York court allowing con-firmation and enforcement of an arbitration award involving two undomesticated foreign corporations."' Whether this position will be extended to the enforcement of an award against a domestic defendant is problematical.11 2 The Tugee Laces decision is contrary to the policy of the disability provision of the domestication statute, which is to apply sufficient pressure to an offending corporation to force it to domesticate. If the plaintiff corporation should prevail in the arbitration, it may well have achieved in effect precisely what it was seeking when it made its local contract arbitrable under the local statute, for the defendant may be inclined to abide by the award and avoid the further expense and trouble of defending a motion to confirm or prosecuting a motion to vacate. However, assuming that the court of appeals was correct in allowing the use of court processes to compel arbitration, it is difficult to see how any further obstacle can then be placed in the way of the plaintiff's carrying the arbitration all the way to confirmation and judgment. The quality of arbitration as a "special proceeding" hardly permits anything but a formalistic distinction to be made between compelling arbitration and enforcing an award. It would be a waste of the court's and the parties' time for the court to compel arbitration if, subsequently, it would be unwilling to enforce an award."1 3
D. Suits Against Unfaithful Agents
Occasionally a foreign corporation will have to resort to the courts of a state in which it has not domesticated in order to vindicate its rights against one of its own employees or agents. If the employee has withheld funds collected on behalf of the corporation, the corporation's ability to recover them may depend on the familiar issue-whether it has done local business."1 4 The disability is said to express "the broad and controlling rights of the public" which override "the propriety and policy of a rule of private law." 1-5 Some courts, however, have allowed relief on the ground 2 Although the court employs the "special proceeding" dialectic found in Tugee Laces, its holding might be able to be sustained under N.Y. GEN. Coai. LAw § 225, permitting certain actions by undomesticated foreign corporations where the defendant is also a foreign corporation. The opinion does not state sufficient facts to determine whether this is true. either that the employee is "estopped" to deny plaintiff's right to the funds or that a contrary result would sanction employee dishonesty.
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Efforts to harmonize these polar policies are inhibited by the courts' retreat behind "estoppel" and "public rights." While it is true that the state has seen fit to disable the corporation for its misconduct, it is equally true that the agent should be stripped of illicit gains. The fact that one state policy is expressed through legislative enactment and the other is embodied in the common law should have no significance in circumstances where the purpose of the common-law rule can be well served or seriously. injured, depending on the outcome of the case, while the purpose underlying the statute will not be much affected by either result. If the corporation is not allowed to sue, the statutory policy is arguably served by a promotion of an indirect deterrent to noncompliance, but the common-law policy is crippled by removing one of the most effective deterrents to embezzlement-stripping the embezzler of his ill-gotten gains.
11 7 On the other hand, if the corporation is allowed to sue, the common-law policy is promoted and, since the defendant is not among the class intended to be directly protected by the domestication law, the statutory policy is only slightly disserved. Hence, the corporation should be allowed to sue in this kind of case." 8
E. Capacity to Defend Lawsuits
A high degree of uniformity obtains regarding the ability of undomesticated foreign corporations to defend all varieties of suits.
119 The right to do so is held to apply with equal force to substantive and pro-116 United States Express Co. v. Lucas, 36 Ind. 361 (1871) ; cf. Hovey's Estate, 198 Pa. 385, 48 Ati. 311 (1901) (recovery of corporate funds from estate of deceased agent).
117 Of course, the defendant is always subject to criminal prosecution, regardless of the limits on the corporation's right to recover. E.g., Barr v. State, 10 Ala. App. 111, 65 So. 197 (1914) .
118 Other types of actions against agents or employees which have been allowed, evidently without destroying the state's domestication policy, are trover under circumstances in which the contract with the agent-defendant was void due to the corporation's failure to comply, Farrand Co. v. Walker, 169 Mo. App. 602, 155 S.W. 68 (1913) , and a suit for an injunction against the disclosure of trade secrets, JerroldStephens Co. v. Gustaveson, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 11 (W.D. Mo. 1956) .
119 See, e.g., Haberman v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 224 F.2d 401, modified, 225 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1955 401, modified, 225 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. ), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 948 (1956 700 (1955) . Oddly enough, in a state whose statute says nothing about the right to defend in the event of failure to appoint a local agent for service of process and does not require a foreign corporation to appoint such an agent until its articles are filed, such a corporation has been allowed to defend while in total violation of the. law but not if it has taken the first and not the second step of compliance. See Winston v. Idaho Hardwood Co., 23 Cal. App. 211, 137 Pac. 601 (Dist. Ct. App. 1913) .
cedural' 20 defenses. In many jurisdictions the right to defend is now specifically preserved by statute; 1 21 in a few, however, noncompliance statutorily precludes a foreign corporation from the benefits of local laws, especially the statute of limitations.1 2 2 Counterclaim may be one important part of a defendant's position and a foreign corporation will ordinarily be permitted to assert a counterclaim, 2 3 although compliance at that time may be necessary. 2 4 Understandably, this right will usually be denied where the counterclaim is based on an intrastate transaction the vindication of which would otherwise be barred by the relevant statute. 25 The right may, of course, be statutorily withheld,' 6 but in a case where this was not done, even a discontinuance of plaintiff's suit was held not to convert defendant corporation into a "plaintiff" so as to require discontinuance of the counterclaim as well.
2 7
There appears to be no undue hardship on plaintiffs in allowing, within limits, the presentation of counterclaims, whereas their prohibition might permit claims to be presented with less than full disclosure of the probative facts, while simultaneously distorting the purpose behind the maintenanceof-suit disability.
1 2 8 120 Steiner v. 20th Century-Fox Film Corp., 232 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1956) Foreign corporations have not been hindered in their use of substantive defenses.' 29 But neither they, nor those in privity with them, 1 30 have been permitted to raise their own noncompliance as a defense.' 31 A foreign corporation has even been denied the right to defend with its noncompliance a suit brought by its president, although, in his official capacity, he may have been solely responsible for the fact that it had not been domesticated.
IV. PERSONAL CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF OFFICERS
AND SHAREHOLDERS
A final technique for securing compliance with domestication laws is to subject officers, agents, or shareholders to criminal penalties or personal civil liability for local corporate acts. 133 There is little case law embellishing the statutes that employ criminal sanctions; apparently they have seldom been invoked to secure compliance. Personal civil liability has been somewhat more frequently resorted to-at least it was during the early part of this century.
Short of attempts to extend legislative jurisdiction to encompass nondomiciliaries who did not consent to the entry of the corporation of which they were shareholders into the forum state, 13 4 few difficulties were en- countered by parties attempting to hold officers or associates personally liable for corporate obligations under local statutes expressly providing that remedy. 135 And, even in the absence of such a statute, liability was successfully predicated on several common-law theories, the most common of which were that the persons transacting local business were liable as agents for a nonexistent corporate principal (none such having been authorized to do business in the forum state) 16 and that the attempt to do business without qualification was equivalent to coming into the state as a partnership, without corporate immunity. 37 In theory the "agency" approach seems narrower than the "partnership" approach, for the latter apparently permits even those who did not actually conduct the corporate affairs-including inactive associates 13s-to be reached. LQ. 90, 94-95 (1933) . Acknowledging the inadequacies of personal liability, one
Recently, the number of suits to impose liability on associates with regard to corporate obligations has diminished considerably. Statutes in some states still make certain individuals financially responsible, 1 43 but only two post-1940 suits involving such responsibility for the transactions of undomesticated corporations have been found. 144 The lack of recent reported decisions on this question might be explained by several factors. The broadening of the "doing business" concept has enabled local citizens and creditors more readily to secure local service of process on and, assuming solvency, pecuniary relief from the corporation itself. Statutes are more explicit in describing the circumstances in which recovery may be had, and against whom, thereby limiting the incidence of recourse to higher state tribunals. Resort to bankruptcy has become more common for distressed associations; local creditors with more opportunities to press their claims at such proceedings are not forced to initiate their own suits. Finally, there is a trend toward restricting the liability of corporate officials in other areas of litigation which could conceivably influence creditors' conduct in this matter. 145 Despite these attempts at explanation, it must be noted that a thorough investigation focused on this particular question is necessary before a completely satisfying answer can be given.
author still argued that the technique did protect local citizens from insolvent or illegal operations. Ladd, supra note 136, at 305. Solvent enterprises, it was thought, would be estopped to deny their noncompliance, and there would be no need to sue individual associates. Insolvent enterprises would be deterred from entering the state by the fear that associates would be held personally liable. But courts often rejected the first argument in the most aggravated cases. See American Soap Co. v. Bogue, 114 Ohio St. 149, 150 N.E. 743 (1926) . And the first argument could not be persuasive so long as courts were unwilling to restrict a creditor to an action against the corporation in the first instance. See Joseph T. Ryerson & Son v. Shaw, 277 Ill. 524, 115 N.E. 650 (1917) . 143 See note 133 supra.
before final judgment is entered, and the offending corporation can benefit from these transactions. 153 It is common to find courts labelling these provisions as creating a "plea in abatement" 154 or a "dilatory exception" 115 or as "suspending the remedy." 156 Among the more common explanations for such provisions are those which stress the injustice imposed on a corporation by an absolute bar 157 and those which see the domestication law as an attempt to place foreign corporations on a par with domestic ones in terms of availability of information and amenability to process.
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One matter regarding curability which was once a source of conflict is the interpretation of the word "maintain" in the prohibitory statutes. 159 Although infrequently a court still construes this to mean "begin" or "initiate" suit, 1 60 it is generally held to its literal meaning, that upon the plea of noncompliance being entered the suit can no longer be "maintained," but that it may be freely instituted. 161 Several consequences may follow from this interpretation. For one, foreign corporations may be encouraged to do intrastate business while undomesticated, assuming the risk that if they eventually need the services of the local courts they may have to pay a penalty and accrued fees.'6 The disability need be of concern only if it is invoked in litigation. For another, a statute which merely defers the time of trial and provides the local citizen with no substantive defense against a foreign corporation is not likely to be invoked with regularity. Such a statute fails as a weapon when the state delegates its enforcement to defendants, since they cannot be relied upon to abate suits if delay is not in their best interests. Thus corporate offenders, both the crafty and the affirming court stated that "in view of its persistent refusal to abide by the requirements of our law it must suffer the consequence . . . and cannot avail itself of the benefit of our court." 168
VII. CONCLUSION
The picture of state control of undomesticated foreign corporations presents anything but a uniform pattern for analysis. State legislatures and courts have built their systems through a trial and error process of penalization and toleration, of rigidity and flexibility-with an occasional loan from a neighboring sovereign. Old laws have cluttered the statute books, working in some cases to impede and in others to enhance the development of an internally consistent policy. Some states seem to have had no unified policy over the years. To find patterns or trends within this maze is conjectural at best, and those seemingly discerned sometimes lack empirical endorsement.
Considerable gloss has been added to the statutes of some states, while others have required only occasional judicial construction. In part this reflects no more than the incidence and volume of local commercial activity. But this explanation fails to account for the grouping of Florida, Arkansas, and Louisiana, with New York, Illinois, and Texas, as states with great numbers of reported cases in this area. Other factors must be present. One which may be suggested is that the more intricate the statute or its use of conceptual terminology, the greater the need and demand for judicial elaboration. Although this cannot be conclusively demonstrated, it is supported by comparing the experience of New York and Arkansas. New York has long operated on a bare skeleton of a regulatory statute 169 and the incidence of litigation has not been disproportionate to its importance as a commercial center, whereas Arkansas, with a detailed statute, which bristles with prohibitions and penalties 17 0 --probably reflecting a generally more hostile attitude toward foreign corporations-has had a thriving volume of litigation. On the other hand, New Jersey's retaliatory statute, 1 requiring the courts to apply both New Jersey law and whatever harsher law may be in force in the state where the offending corporation is incorporated, has not spawned an inordinate amount of litigation.
The initial determinant in all noncompliance situations is the presence or absence of intrastate activity. Despite occasional crystallizations of specifics, either by statute or by settled judicial interpretation, this area remains extremely unpredictable. However, the uncertainties of the "doing business" concept apparently have not given rise to the application of 168 Id. at 174, 103 N.E. at 302. Despite the sharp words accompanying the dismissal it is unclear whether the plaintiff would be barred from bringing an action after compliance. different criteria among different classes of suits-contract, tort, replevin, and so forth. The variations occur only in the categories incident to the implementation of the statute, such as penalty collection, qualification in order to maintain suit, and amenability to service of process. While different criteria could be established for different kinds of actions, their possible value is questionable, and no tendency in that direction is presently discernible. The developments have been, and are likely to remain, largely ad hoc.
The success of large fines, actively enforced, as a method of barring corporate intruders is neither proven nor refuted by the evidence presently available. But it does seem that, to the extent they could serve this function, fines have not kept pace with inflation and the expansion of corporate entities. In many states they are so small as to be inconsequential. If it can be demonstrated that there is in fact a deterrent element to penaltiesthough it must be recalled that some states ignore this possibility '
1 2 --they should be brought to a level commensurate with the financial resources of offenders. A figure once established should be reviewed periodically to see that it is still capable of achieving its purpose. Another observation which may be made is that the efficacy of the domestication statutes is dependent on stringent enforcement of these and other sanctions. While the state may be unable to afford the price of rigorous initial detection, once uncovered, the offender must be subjected to the full force of the statute. Compliance will not be achieved through undue solicitude for the plight of the self-styled unwitting offender, its officers, and its agents.
The maintenance-of-suit disability has apparently been the most important sanction in the enforcement of domestication statutes. This will almost certainly continue to be true, but the frequency of its invocation is likely to diminish in the many states where subsequent compliance can cure defects. Since the volume of intrastate activity by foreign corporations is unlikely to lessen, the states will have either to fall back on relatively unused provisions or to enact new ones to protect their interests. Or, as a deliberate choice, violators may be tolerated in the belief that their activities within the state produce returns in other forms-such as by stimulating vitality in the business climate of certain communities-to a degree which outweighs the difficulties of enforcing compliance and the benefits gained from such action.
A.J.E.
